In simulation theory, reality is replaced by its signs, creating a hyperreality which becomes, not an image, but a sort of copy of the real world. The difference between an image and a copy lies in the actual replacement of some things by others. The purpose of an image is to reflect or show objects in a certain form. A copy serves no purpose; however, the operationalization contained in mass production reflects human needs and desires to live a better life, be happy, etc., either for no underlying reason or due to the need to fill a certain sort of emptiness. The main purpose of my paper is to discuss the status of rationality in conjunction with personal needs, desires and choices, both from Baudrillard’s perspective and in a  contemporary philosophical context. The research question concerns two issues. First, the question of whether rational needs and choices of agents are possible in a culture of simulation, as well as to what extent agents may know that they are not thoughtlessly copying others, but rather acting independently in order to achieve the things and values that matter to them. The second issue is related to the possibility of ethics in a simulation culture where, according to Baudrillard, values are exterminated, becoming operational and useless imitations of those values that matter to agents. I intend to discuss Baudrillard’s skepticism and the nihilistic conclusions drawn in his works in the context of contemporary philosophy of responsibility.