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In this essay we revisit some of the literature produced on mind loading and extended theory of mind. In the next section, we approach a new type of cybercrime, namely neurocrime (the first news and formulations about this type of crime began to appear at the beginning of this century), and from its definition and scope, we seek to understand how to frame a theory of the brain-mind relationship. Finally, we outline a new configuration of the theory of the extended mind, which, according to the premises raised by the previous reflections, will allow, on one hand, to dictate the end of the myth of mind uploading and on the other hand, allowing to show that an extended mind is also an artificialized mind that we called the Artificial Extended Mind theory (AEM). This certainly will allow to open doors to future reflections on the integration of artificial intelligence in an increasingly artificial human reality

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We intent to show two things in this essay: that the mind uploading is no longer a myth and that the extended mind is a reality. To this theory we called the Artificial Extended Mind (AEM). Thus, the essay will be divided in three main sections. In the first section, we will revisit some of the literature produced on mind loading and extended theory of mind. In the next section, we approach a new type of cybercrime, namely neurocrime (the first news and formulations about this type of crime began to appear at the beginning of this century), with the purpose of seeing possibilities to understand the concept of mind and brain in this specific scenario. From its definition and scope, we seek to understand how to frame a theory of the brain-mind relationship. Finally, we outline a new configuration of the theory of the extended mind, which, according to the premises raised by the previous reflections, will allow, on one hand, to dictate the end of the myth of mind uploading and on the other hand, allowing to show that an extended mind is also an artificialized mind (AEM theory). this certainly will allow to open doors to future reflections on the integration of artificial intelligence in an increasingly artificial human reality.

References

 

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Paulo Alexandre e Castro (Portugal) 7590
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