Fake news may or may not have become more prevalent since the advent of social media. Our awareness of fake news, however, has certainly heightened. This latter phenomenon is the central focus of this paper. Whilst awareness of fake news is plausibly a good thing – that is, if we treat the existence of fake news as a constant, it is probably better to be attuned to its presence than oblivious to it – this paper will highlight some epistemic problems that follow from its heightened visibility. I start with a distinction between two types of epistemic effect arising from fake news. The first-order effects are those that follow from the consumption of fake news itself, such as the acquisition of falsehoods. Philosophers interested in fake news have tended to focus on these first-order harms (Levy 2017; Rini 2017). The second-order effect are those that follow not from the consumption itself, but from the visibility or awareness of fake news. The central thesis of this paper is that the perception of fake news as a pervasive problem leads to a range of epistemically harmful effects, irreducible to the effects of actually consuming fake news. Drawing on the resources from the flourishing field of vice epistemology, I argue that the perception of fake news as a pervasive problem in society encourages two epistemic vices. First, by corroding the networks of trust that underpin epistemic relationships, the awareness of fake news promotes the vice of hyper-autonomy. Second, and relatedly, it leads to a form of intellectual arrogance, in which individuals no longer feel accountable to one another. A widespread increase in these two vices, I further argue, helps to explain the phenomenon of ‘fake fake news’: the peremptory, and baseless, dismissal of legitimate but inconvenient questions and reports as fake news.